Although a rich body of research has explored the sources of party polarization in the US House of Representatives, it has focused only on the House since the late 1970s. Drawing on a dataset of historical election outcomes, legislative voting and survey data, we take an alternative approach that examines both the US Senate and the House in their broader historical contexts. We argue that the unusually bipartisan era of the 1950s created a set of circumstances that enabled congressional parties to remain relatively unpolarized throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. Although the national parties became more ideologically distinct in the mid-1960s, congressional parties lagged behind. As a result, a group of moderate legislators emerged who were cross-pressured between their national parties and their constituencies. Only when natural patterns of electoral loss and retirement replaced these legislators did congressional party polarization re-emerge.
increase in income inequality across districts, 3 demographic change in the population 4 and the decline of the one-party South. 5 With a few exceptions, this body of research has focused primarily on House party polarization in the latter decades of the twentieth century. Although this work has generated a rich set of findings, its conclusions are mostly limited to one institution and one time period. This article offers an alternative perspective that examines both the House and the Senate, and examines present-day polarization in a broader historical context. Our argument is rooted in an examination of long-term historical trends in congressional party polarization, which reveals two important features. First, since the mid-nineteenth century, trends in polarization have moved together in both the House and the Senate. As levels of polarization declined in the House, so they did in the Senate (and vice versa) . Secondly, the recent period of polarization mirrors patterns of polarization that have prevailed throughout most of congressional history. In fact, the truly unusual historical period is the bipartisan era immediately following the Second World War. Taking these two points into account, our argument examines the return to polarization in the House and Senate during the 1970s and 1980s in the light of the unusual decline in polarization in the 1950s. 6 The story unfolds in three major stages. First, we argue that partisanship in congressional elections begins to diverge from presidential elections in the mid-1960s. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, liberal voters often vote for Republican presidential and congressional candidates and a number of conservative voters choose Democratic candidates. The blurring of partisan lines on key national issues (like race and the role of government in society) enables this cross-party voting. Beginning in the mid-1960s, however, liberals have voted more consistently for Democratic presidential candidates and conservatives more consistently for Republicans. At the congressional level, however, we do not observe the same sorting. Instead, congressional voters have continued to exhibit high levels of cross-party voting, whereby liberals often vote for Republican congressional candidates, and conservatives have often selected Democrats. Thus, even as partisan distinctions at the presidential level became clearer throughout the late 1960s, partisan distinctions in Congress lagged behind.
The second stage of the story focuses on this lag in congressional party polarization and the subsequent rise of cross-pressured legislators. As the national parties and presidential candidates adopted distinct ideological stances on a range of different issues, a set of legislators emerged who were caught in the middle. These legislators faced pressure from the national party to take relatively extreme ideological stances and countervailing pressures from their constituents. Cross-pressured Republicans were pulled in a more conservative direction by their national party and in a more moderate direction by their constituents -many of whom were ideologically liberal. Similarly, cross-pressured Democrats faced an increasingly liberal national party and more moderate constituencies. These cross-pressured members developed multiple strategies to stay in office (such as the personal vote), even as they were out-of-step with their national party, constituency or both. Many of these members voted more moderately than their non-cross-pressured counterparts, thus contributing to sustained levels of bipartisanship in Congress in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The third -and final -stage of the argument examines the return to polarization in the late 1970s and 1980s in its historical context. We argue that Congress does not return to historic norms of polarization until these cross-pressured legislators are replaced by members who better align party and constituency preferences. The new members tend to be closer to the preferences of their constituency and, lacking cross-pressures, are more ideologically extreme than their predecessors. As cross-pressured members retire or lose bids for re-election, the distinctions between partisan coalitions re-emerge in Congress. It is only through this process of electoral replacement that parties in Congress re-polarize.
The article examines each of the three stages in turn -the divergence of presidential and congressional elections, the persistence of cross-pressured legislators, and processes of delayed electoral replacement. In doing so, this article diverges from previous work on polarization in important ways. First, it examines both the House and the Senate. Secondly, although some previous scholars have examined long-term historical trends in polarization, 7 none have examined how the unusual period of bipartisanship in the 1950s affected the return to polarization in the 1970s and 1980s. Thirdly, although some previous work has linked demographic and electoral changes to polarization, 8 this article establishes an important mechanism through which changes in congressional polarization are linked to changes in elections -cross-pressuring. Changing electoral patterns lead to the rise of cross-pressured legislators in Congress, which eventually gives way to patterns of electoral replacement. In building this argument, we begin with an empirical examination of long-term historical trends in House and Senate party polarization. We demonstrate the uniqueness of the immediate era following the Second World War in both chambers and discuss the implications this has for existing approaches to understanding congressional party polarization.
I D E N T I F Y I N G H I S T O R I C A L P A T T E R N S O F P O L A R I Z A T I O N
Throughout most of US congressional history, parties in the House and Senate have been relatively polarized. House and Senate, 1st dimension DW-Nominate scores, 1867-2003 by first-dimension DW-Nominate scores. 9 In both chambers, the difference between party medians peaks in 1895 and plummets to its lowest level in 1947 and the early 1950s. Aside from the relative convergence of party medians in the 1940s and 1950s, however, congressional parties have been consistently polarized. Placed in this historical context, the rise of polarization in the final decades of the twentieth century does not look as unusual. The median differences in this era are similar to previous periods. Instead, the unusual historical period to be explained is the era immediately after the Second World War.
An alternative measure of polarization that examines the degree of overlap between the two parties highlights the unique features of the era immediately after the Second World War. Parties can be polarized, with high levels of internal cohesion and low levels of intra-party overlap, or they can be convergent, with low levels of internal cohesion and high levels of intra-party overlap. In the latter case, although the most liberal Democrats and the most conservative Republicans remain distinct from each other, legislators in the middle of the two-party distribution overlap across parties. The more conservative Democrats are hard to distinguish from the more liberal Republicans.
We thus explore the degree of congressional party overlap over time using two different measures of ideology: first-dimension DW-Nominate scores , and Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores . Both measures rate the liberalism (or conservatism) of elected officials based on their roll-call voting records. We use these scores to identify how liberal or conservative members were relative to other members of their party. We identify the cutpoints for the 10 per cent, 25 per cent and 50 per cent (the median value) most conservative Democrats, and count the number of Republicans who are more liberal than each of these cutpoints. Likewise, we identify the 10 per cent, 25 per cent and 50 per cent most liberal Republicans and count the number of Democrats who are more conservative than each of these cutpoints. As an example, in 1947, the most conservative 10 per cent of Democrats had DW-Nominate scores higher than 0.10. To identify the degree of overlap with Republicans, we count the number of Republicans who had DW-Nominate scores lower than 0.10. Figures 2a (House) and 2b (Senate) show the number of overlapping members in each Congress from 1867 to 2003. For the purposes of brevity, we only show the distribution using DW-Nominate scores.
10 These graphs demonstrate an unprecedented level of overlapping voting in both the House and the Senate in the years immediately after the Second World War. The DW-Nominate distributions illustrate that there was almost no House party overlap prior to the 1940s. In the Senate, there was some overlap in the 1920s and the 1930s, but it was mild compared to the immediate post-war era. By the 1940s and 1950s in both the House and the Senate, the degree of partisan overlap spiked upwards. By 1947, almost 45 per cent of House Democrats were more conservative than the 10 per cent most liberal Republicans. The numbers peaked around 1963, when over 55 per cent of House Democrats were more conservative than the 10 per cent most liberal House Republicans, and almost a third of Democrats were more conservative than the 25 per cent most liberal Republicans. Even DW-Nominate scores, 1867 -2003 10 per cent of House Democrats were more conservative than the median Republican member of the House. Among Republicans, levels of overlap grew sharply between 1947 and 1955, and persisted at high levels until the early 1970s when the number of members in the overlap region began to decline. In the Senate, the numbers were highest in the late 1960s. In 1969, 19 per cent of Democrats were more conservative than the 10 per cent most liberal Republicans, and 19 per cent of Republicans were more liberal than the 10 per cent most conservative Democrats. This level of overlap persisted through the late 1970s, when it began to decline in both chambers, and lasted in weaker DW-Nominate scores, 1867 -2003 form through the 1980s. Like Roberts and Smith, we find that for both parties in the House, polarization (or low levels of partisan overlap) re-emerges in the 1980s. 11 We perform the same analysis looking only at non-Southern states to see if the partisan overlap was merely an artefact of one-party politics dominant in the South prior to the 1970s. We find that although the degree of overlap decreases among Democrats, the mid-twentieth century still emerges as a unique period of high partisan overlap. Among Republicans, we find that high levels of partisan overlap persist because there were few Republicans in the South.
Two important points emerge from this examination of historical patterns of polarization in Congress. First, patterns of polarization in the House and the Senate have been markedly similar throughout most of history. This finding is robust to several other measures of partisanship, including party voting scores and party unity scores.
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These parallel trends in the House and the Senate have important implications for our understanding of the sources of congressional party polarization. Any explanation for polarization should take both chambers into account. Endogenous institutional changes -like the 1970s reforms strengthening the power of parties, the Subcommittee Bill of Rights (1973) , and the Committee Reform Amendments (1974) -are often cited as sources of polarization in the House, but they did not happen simultaneously in the Senate. 13 This implies that some exogenous political changes impacted levels of voting in Congress, influencing both chambers simultaneously. In addition, focusing on explanations like redistricting that only affect the House is not adequate to explain polarization in the Senate. To capture the full story we must look at both chambers.
Secondly, this examination of historical patterns in Congress reveals the importance of understanding the era immediately after the Second World War the better to understand polarization in the latter decades of the twentieth century. By understanding the unusual decline in partisanship after the Second World War, we can better understand the sources of a return to polarization in the 1970s and 1980s. Previous scholars have recognized the unique levels of bipartisanship in the era immediately after the Second World War, but none have linked the decline in that era to the subsequent rise of polarization in the late 1970s and 1980s.
14 Instead, most research has sought to explain the final decades of the twentieth century as the unique period. Because the 1950s were an unusual period in congressional history, however, present-day polarization should be understood in the light of this broader historical context. Senate, 1877 -1986 ', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 14 (1989 
An examination of historical trends in party polarization reveals a striking divergence between presidential and congressional elections around the mid-1960s. Between the end of the Second World War and the 1964 Goldwater-Johnson presidential election, a large number of voters with liberal views voted for Republican presidential and congressional candidates while many voters with conservative views voted for Democratic candidates. This cross-party voting diminishes in presidential elections beginning with 1964, but persists in congressional elections long after that.
To study the relationship between voter ideology and vote choice, we rely on American National Election Studies (ANES) cross-sectional studies from 1948 to 2000. Within each cross-sectional study, we create an opinion index using methodology established in Stimson for each respondent on two key issues. 15 We examine two issues prevalent in politics after the Second World War that help distinguish individuals with a more liberal political philosophy from those with a more conservative view, and are evaluated in ANES studies over time. The issues are: (1) the role of government in society, and (2) issues related to race and civil rights. We identify any ANES question having to do with either issue and re-code the respondent's answers as 1, 0 or Ϫ 1: 1 indicates support for greater government intervention on issues having to do with race or the role of government; Ϫ 1 indicates support for less government intervention on issues related to race or the role of government; 0 implies neutrality. We then create a composite score for each individual that represents the mean of her answers on the Ϫ 1 to 1 scale. Each individual has two scores -one for her views on race and another for her views on the role of government in society. 16 Using these opinion indices, we identify the percentage of respondents in each year who support greater government intervention on race or the role of government yet still vote for Republican presidential, House or Senate candidates. Similarly, we identify the percentage of respondents who support less government intervention on these two issues and still vote for Democratic candidates. It is important to note that our primary interest here is in comparing the level of cross-party voting within each year. How does the level of cross-party voting for Congress compare to the level of cross-party voting for the president in each year? Figure 3 shows the total percentage of voters in each year who voted for a candidate from the party opposite their views on race and the role of government.
For both issues, the divergence between presidential and congressional elections becomes apparent from around 1964. Prior to 1964, levels of cross-party voting were relatively similar for presidential and congressional elections. voting in congressional elections, in other words, mirrored presidential elections more closely in the 1950s and early 1960s than in the latter decades. Beginning in 1964, however, the level of cross-party voting in presidential elections started to decline. Fewer and fewer voters who held liberal views on race and the role of government voted for Republican presidential candidates. Despite these changes in presidential elections, however, cross-party voting in congressional elections persisted. From 1964 to the late 1980s, the level of cross-party voting in congressional elections was, on average, 6 percentage points higher than cross-party voting in presidential elections. Voters with liberal views on race and the role of government continued to choose Republican congressional candidates and vice versa.
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Although voters in presidential elections sorted themselves into the appropriate party based on their views on race and the role of government from around 1964, the same pattern did not emerge in congressional elections. In congressional elections, voters with liberal views on these issues continued to vote for Republicans (and vice versa) even beyond the 1960s.
18 This divergence between presidential and congressional elections emerged from the bipartisanship of the 1950s. During the 1950s, the distinctions between parties on key national issues like race and the role of government were not so clear. Although the New 17 See Matthew S. Levendusky, 'Sorting in the U.S. Mass Electorate' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 2005), for more details on historical sorting processes in the electorate. This pattern of divergence between presidential and congressional elections is also clear using three alternative approaches. If we measure respondent ideology using either (1) the seven-point ANES party identification or (2) the seven-point liberal-conservative scale (scale begins in 1972), we see convergence before the mid-1960s and divergence thereafter. In other words, regardless of how we measure respondent ideology, voters exhibit similar levels of cross-party voting in congressional and presidential elections prior to the mid-1960s. After 1964, the level of cross-party voting in presidential elections declines, while cross-party voting in congressional elections stays relatively constant. A third approach regresses the probability of voting Democratic in presidential and congressional elections on respondent opinions on race and the role of government. The same pattern emerges. Predicted probabilities from presidential and congressional vote choice regressions parallel each other until the early 1960s. In 1964, 1972 and from 1980 onward, the number of conservatives voting Democratic for president averages less than 5 per cent. In contrast, conservative votes for House candidates average over 27 per cent from 1964 onward and over 20 per cent in the Senate. 18 This explains why we still see an increase in partisan overlap in Congress even after 1964. Figure 2 shows that overlap among House Republicans and both parties in the Senate increased in the late 1960s, as almost a third of voters continued to choose congressional candidates who did not necessarily support their views on issues like race and the role of government in society through the early 1970s. Thus, in many states, the Senate constituencies continued to pull legislators in more moderate directions than their national parties. For instance, six Senate Republicans were in the overlap region in 1967 who were not there in 1965. Of these six members, three members, first elected to the Senate prior to 1964, moved into the overlap region as the national parties polarized and they felt contrarian pulls from their constituents. The three newly elected members were all Rockefeller Republicans, carried into office with the unique political circumstances of the 1966 elections (similar patterns hold true for the 1968 elections, and then we begin to see the decline in numbers thereafter). In addition, there are several reasons why we would expect the Senate to be slower to react to changes in national party politics than the House. First, the size of Senate constituencies creates more heterogeneous bases of support, making it harder for sweeping change to occur (Frances E. Lee and Bruce Oppenheimer, Sizing up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of Equal Representation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999)). In addition, because only a third of the Senate is up for re-election every two years, we do not see the same wholesale change in the Senate as we do in the House. Finally, the special circumstances of the 1968 election, in which anti-Johnson sentiment propelled a number of liberal Republicans into office, also contributed to this pattern. Thus, we begin to see the decline in overlap in the mid-1970s, which is the same time we witness a decline in cross-party voting in Congress among voters. This comports with our subsequent analyses of electoral replacement, where the patterns begin to emerge in the 1960s but become really clear in the 1970s and 1980s, as congressional polarization begins to re-emerge. We are indebted to Alan Ware on this point.
Deal parties were clearly distinguished by socio-economic class, a wealth of research has characterized the decline of class-based voting after the Second World War. 19 Similarly, until the early 1960s, it was not clear whether Republicans or Democrats would be more supportive of civil rights. 20 Without clear distinctions between the parties on key issues like race and the role of government, people with liberal views on the issues voted for either party and vice versa. Thus, it is with some retrospective hindsight that we can characterize voters in the 1950s with liberal views on race and the role of government as holding positions consistent with the Democratic party. Beginning in 1964, however, as presidential politics began to diverge around issues like civil rights, cross-party voting at the presidential level declined.
At the congressional level, however, factors like the personal vote kept congressional candidates relatively immune from the rise of polarizing issues in national politics even after the 1960s. The rise of the 'personal vote' is well-documented in political science scholarship through studies of the incumbency advantage. 21 Beginning in the 1950s, the incumbency advantage increased more or less consistently until its peak in 1988, when incumbents had a 12 per cent electoral advantage over non-incumbents. One commonly used method of measuring the incumbency advantage is the slurge, or the mean value of the sophomore surge and the retirement slump. 22 Measures of slurge over time show that the sharpest rise in the incumbency advantage is in the late 1950s and 1960s, just before congressional elections began to diverge from presidential elections. Simultaneously, the percentage of districts with split partisan results at the presidential and congressional levels moved from zero at the start of the twentieth century, into a dramatic rise between 1948 and 1972. 23 Even in the 1960s, as issues like civil rights, the Vietnam War and the environment emerged as dividing issues, voters continued to exhibit high levels of cross-party voting in congressional elections, but split their ticket at the presidential level. Both of these patterns -the rise in the incumbency advantage and the rise in split districts -demonstrate the increasing tendency of congressional elections to diverge from presidential elections in their level of partisanship. As the personal vote and the incumbency advantage increases, the impact of partisanship in determining electoral outcomes declines. 24 Even after the mid-1960s, congressional elections remained relatively insulated from national electoral forces. Thus, the re-polarization of congressional elections lagged behind the polarization of national presidential politics.
T H E P E R S I S T E N C E O F C R O S S -P R E S S U R E D L E G I S L A T O R S
The divergence of presidential and congressional politics in the mid-1960s and the subsequent lag in congressional re-polarization leads us to re-frame the usual question about congressional party polarization. Instead of focusing solely on the recent period of polarization and asking why congressional parties have polarized so much since the 1970s, we ask why congressional polarization lagged behind presidential polarization. Our approach to understanding this question focuses on the rise of members of Congress who were cross-pressured between their constituencies and their national party. Unlike presidential politics, this cross-pressuring helps sustain levels of bi-partisanship in Congress beyond the 1950s and 1960s.
As the national parties grow increasingly distinct around presidential elections throughout the 1960s, a group of cross-pressured legislators emerges. 25 These legislators are pulled in one direction by their constituents and in another direction by their national party.
26 For example, a Border State Democrat like Jim Jones of Oklahoma is pulled in a more conservative direction by his district, but in a more liberal direction by the Democratic party. Likewise, Northeastern Republicans during the 1960s are pulled in a more conservative direction by their national party, but in more liberal directions by their constituencies. Pulled in two opposite directions by their party and their constituency, these members have a strategic dilemma: how can they balance the countervailing pressures while still winning re-election? 27 Caught between their parties and their constituencies, we argue that these cross-pressured members have several options that range from being very partisan to non-partisan (in how their responses affect their parties). First, the most partisan response that members can have is simply to switch parties. We count this as a partisan response because members who are cross-pressured and switch parties subsequently reduce the dissonance between 24 Stephen Ansolabehere and James M. Snyder Jr, 'The Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Elections: An Analysis of State and Federal Offices, 1942 -2000 ', Election Law Journal, 1 (2002 ', Political Research Quarterly, 49 (1996), 729-48. 26 Note that cross-pressuring can arise from the districts moving or the parties moving. For example, a Democrat from a relatively conservative district could become cross-pressured if the Democratic party in Congress becomes more liberal and the constituency stays the same. Alternately, demographic changes could lead the constituency to become more conservative and the national party could stay the same. In either case (or the case in which both the party and the constituency moves), cross-pressuring, or a mismatch between constituency and party preferences, emerges.
27 Richard Fleischer and Jon R. Bond, 'The Shrinking Middle in the Us Congress', British Journal of Political Science, 34 (2004), 429-51. their parties and their constituencies, thus enabling them to vote more comfortably with the national party.
28 A second option is for members to try to balance the cross-pressures between their party and their district. This can lead to cross-pressured members being slightly out of step with both their parties and their constituencies. For example, cross-pressured Republicans who are trying to balance the cross-pressures will probably be too conservative for their constituencies, but too liberal for their parties (and vice versa for Democrats). This balancing can encompass a range of behaviours, and includes members like Gillis Long (D-LA) who votes sometimes with his own party in the House and other times with the Republicans. Other members like Phil Gramm (D-TX), who votes consistently with Reagan Republicans in the House, represent the third option. The third option is the least partisan response that members can have: they can simply vote with the opposite party. We count this as the least partisan response because these members buck the pressures of their national party to vote more consistently with the preferences of their constituents. Finally, there is a fourth option that does not lie on the continuum of most partisan to least partisan. This fourth option is simply for members to leave office through strategic retirement, or be forced to leave by electoral loss.
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The middle option -balancing -is particularly interesting because these members have to find ways to compensate for being slightly out-of-step with either their parties or their constituencies, or both. We hypothesize that the growing levels of the personal vote during the 1960s play a critical role in helping these members stay in office. 30 A disproportionately high number of cross-pressured legislators stay in office despite being somewhat out of step with either their party or their constituencies by developing strategies that increase their personal vote and insulate them from rising tides of ideological voting. 31 It is important to note that one strategy legislators can use is to vote with the opposite party -in other words, the source of their personal vote can be their issue-based alignment with their constituency. In all cases, however, the personal vote plays an important role in shielding cross-pressured members from the polarizing trends of the 1960s. By protecting such members, the personal vote and cross-pressuring thus help delay the re-emergence of polarization in Congress. Based on our argument, then, we expect that members who are cross-pressured will have higher personal vote scores than members who are not cross-pressured, since they have to rely more on the personal vote to help them win re-election. Similarly, we expect that rates of switching parties and voting with the other party will be higher for cross-pressured members. To examine this, we identify the members who are cross-pressured. First, looking at party-switchers, we find that there are sixteen cases of members who switch parties in the House from the 1950s to the 1990s, and three cases of members who switched parties in the Senate. 34 Among the nineteen House and Senate members who switched parties, twelve (or 63 per cent) are cross-pressured. However, changing parties was not a frequent occurrence. Instead, most cross-pressured members tried to balance. To look more closely at members who tried to balance the cross-pressures between their constituencies and their parties, and members who opted to vote with the opposite party, we examine the relationship between cross-pressuring and electoral results, the personal vote and roll-call voting behaviour. Table 1 shows the results for Republicans, Southern Democrats and non-Southern Democrats.
The top line in Table 1 shows the mean DW-Nominate scores for members who are cross-pressured and members who are not cross-pressured. If our argument that these members contribute to cross-party voting in Congress is correct, then we expect that cross-pressured members are ideologically more moderate than their non-cross-pressured counterparts. The results show that for both the House and the Senate, across both parties and Southern and non-Southern Democrats, our expectations are correct. Among Democrats, the cross-pressured members were less liberal, and among Republicans, the cross-pressured members were less conservative. In addition, t-tests demonstrate that these are statistically significant differences.
The second part of Table 1 looks specifically at members who sought to 'balance' the cross-pressures between their constituency and their party. We look here at the cross-pressured members who stayed in office and compare them to non-cross-pressured members who stayed in office. We expect that these cross-pressured members had a harder time securing re-election because they were less in line with their national parties and their constituencies. Thus, we expect that they would have lower winning vote margins. In addition, to maintain office, we expect that cross-pressured members would build up a larger personal vote (measured by slurge scores) than members who were not cross-pressured. The results show that cross-pressured members won with lower vote margins, even though they had higher slurge scores than their non-cross-pressured counterparts. The only exception to this is non-Southern Democratic Senators, whose average winning vote margin for cross-pressured members was equal to that of Step', we also develop alternate measures of constituency liberalism that hold a variety of economic and demographic variables constant and find the results to be the same. It is possible that there are members who are cross-pressured because their constituencies consistently vote with the opposite party at the presidential level, but do not meet our 45-55 criteria. We use this standard of measuring cross-pressuring, however, because it is a more conservative test. 34 See Nokken, 'Dynamics of Congressional Loyalty', for more discussion of these cases.
T A B L E 1 The Implications of Being Cross-Pressured
House: cross-pressured representatives (N in parentheses) Democrats Republicans Non-South South (all states) Not C-P † C-P † Not C-P † C-P † Not C-P † C-P † Not C-P † C-P † Not C-P † C-P † Not C-P † C-P † non-cross-pressured members. Even for these Senators, however, the slurge score for cross-pressured members was higher than the slurge score for non-cross-pressured members. The differences are also statistically different in all cases except when the N is very small for certain groups of cross-pressured Senators.
Ideology
The third section of Table 1 looks at the probability that members will vote with the opposite party. We measure voting with the opposite party using our measure of partisan overlap outlined earlier. Here, we expect that cross-pressured members will fall into the overlap region far more often than non-cross-pressured members. Again, looking at the results in Tables 1a and 1b, it is clear that cross-pressured members were in the overlap region at statistically higher rates than non-crosspressured members.
In sum, cross-pressured members were more ideologically moderate than their non-cross-pressured counterparts, and had a larger personal vote than non-cross-pressured members. Because the personal vote insulated them, the electoral sorting that occurred in presidential elections did not occur in congressional elections. Cross-pressured members of Congress stayed in office with the personal vote, but they often voted less partisan than non-cross-pressured members, thus sustaining low levels of polarization in Congress through the 1960s and 1970s. As long as these members stayed in office, congressional party polarization took longer to re-emerge.
D E L A Y E D E L E C T O R A L R E P L A C E M E N T A N D T H E R E T U R N T O P O L A R I Z A T I O N
Given the lag in congressional party polarization and the persistence of cross-pressured legislators in Congress, the third and final part of our story asks how congressional parties re-polarized in the late 1970s and 1980s. We develop the electoral replacement hypothesis, or the idea that, eventually, through natural processes of electoral replacement, cross-pressured members retire or lose re-election, and new members who bring district and party preferences into better alignment replace them. Democrats who are too liberal for their constituencies are replaced by Republicans who are more conservative, and Republicans who are too conservative for their districts are replaced by more liberal Democrats. As patterns of electoral loss and strategic retirement replaced cross-pressured members in the late 1970s and 1980s, parties in Congress became better sorted and more tightly defined, and partisan voting scores in Congress consequently rose.
There are three key observable implications of this electoral replacement hypothesis. First, there is the question of what kinds of members are losing office. We expect that seats that shift from Democrat to Republican should be losses among Democrats who are too liberal for their constituencies. Similarly, seats that shift from Republican to Democrat should be losses among Republicans who are too conservative for their constituency. These are the members cross-pressured between their parties and their constituents. Secondly, who replaces these members? According to our hypothesis, members who are closer to district preferences should replace them. In other words, the Republican replacements should be more conservative than their Democratic predecessors and Democratic replacements should be more liberal than their Republican predecessors -and, importantly, both should be closer to district preferences, thus bringing party and constituency back into alignment. Thirdly, these seat changes should contribute to the overall redefinition of partisan lines. Polarization of congressional parties emerges as the ideological distribution of congressional seats changes. We expect that the electoral replacement of cross-pressured members brings constituency and party preferences into better alignment, thus impacting the overall ideological distribution of congressional seats.
To examine these hypotheses, we use DW-Nominate residuals to measure a member's ideological distance from the district, a method used in previous research. 35 First, we regress the member's DW-Nominate score on a three-term moving average of constituency presidential vote. The resulting residual score acts as a measure of the member's ideological distance from the constituency. We should note that we also calculated the residuals using alternative specifications of the relationship between presidential vote and member ideology, including a cubic specification. In addition, consistent with some previous research, 36 we include controls for other electoral factors in determining the size of the residual. We find the results to be the same across these different specifications and thus report the results using the basic specification here.
To look first at the question of who loses and who replaces them, Figure 4 shows the relationship between the members who leave office and the members who replace them. On the x-axis, we plot the residual score of the member who leaves office. The y-axis represents the corresponding residual score of the replacement member. By our hypothesis, Democrats who are too liberal for their constituency are replaced by Republicans who are more conservative (and close to constituency preferences), and Republicans who are too conservative for their constituency are replaced by Democrats who are more liberal (and still close to constituency preferences). Thus, we expect that the Democrat-to-Republican replacements will lie in the upper left-hand corner, and Republican-to-Democrat replacements will lie in the bottom right-hand corner. An important point to note is that the replacements are still relatively close to constituency preferences.
Relative to constituency preferences, Democrats who are too liberal (residual scores less than 0) are replaced by Republicans who are more conservative. Similarly, relative to constituency preferences, Republicans who are too conservative (residual scores greater than 0) are replaced by Democrats who are more liberal. Importantly, we find that the effects are the weakest in the 1950s. In terms of Democrat to Republican replacements, we see many cases in which the Republican replacements remain too liberal for the constituencies. In terms of Republican to Democratic replacements, we see the most cases where the Democratic replacement is relatively far from constituency preferences. This is consistent with our contention that the relationship between ideology and partisanship is considerably weakened in the 1950s. It is only in the 1960s that we begin to observe the stronger relationships predicted by the replacement hypothesis. In addition, the number of Democrat-to-Republican and Republican-to-Democrat switches increases in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, consistent with our expectation that this pattern of electoral replacement contributed to increasing polarization. In the House, 4 to 5 per cent of all seats are Democrat-to-Republican and Republican-to-Democrat seat changes in the 1970s and 1990s, as compared to 2 and 3 per cent in the 1950s and 1960s (note that 85-90 per cent of seats do not change hands). In the Senate, the majority of seat changes occur in the 1970s and 1980s, when 4 to 5 per cent of seats are cross-party seat changes (compared to 1 to 3 per cent in the 1950s and 1960s). In other words, the members sort themselves out (or are sorted out) more clearly in the latter decades.
A key part of the electoral replacement hypothesis is the idea that the newly elected members are closer to constituency preferences than their predecessors. As Democrats and Republicans caught in the cross-pressures between their parties and constituencies are replaced, we expect that their replacements bring constituency and party preferences into better alignment; thus, without cross-pressures from the party, the new members are better able to vote more consistently with constituency preferences. This implies that the residual scores of the replacement should be smaller in absolute value than the residual scores of the members out-of-office. Figure 5 examines these residuals for the House and the Senate.
In both chambers, we see that the mean residual score of the replacement is, as expected, smaller than the mean residual score of the member out-of-office. This is true even if we break the data down by decade and examine it separately for each party in each chamber. -of-office vs. replacements, 1954-2000 Note: Distance from the constituency is measured as the standardized residual from regressing DW-Nominate scores on three-term moving averages of constituency presidential vote.
The only exception is among Democratic replacements in the Senate in the 1950s, when the replacement member is slightly further away from the constituency than the member-out-of-office. This is, however, consistent with the idea that the 1950s were a period of unusual bipartisanship and it is not until the latter decades of the twentieth century that patterns of partisan redefinition begin to take effect. The pattern emerges most strongly in the 1970s and 1980s, when partisan voting in congressional elections begins to re-emerge. Members who bring constituency and party preferences into better alignment thus replace cross-pressured Democrats and Republicans. What impact, then, does this have on polarization in Congress?
We argue that polarization re-emerges as patterns of electoral replacement alter the ideological distribution of seats in Congress. Congressional seats which had previously been misaligned are sorted into the proper parties through this process of electoral replacement. Seats that are too conservative for the national Democratic party become Republican and seats that are too liberal for the national Republican party become Democrat. Thus, electoral replacement can help explain changes in the ideological distribution of congressional seats. We run a regression that tests the impact of electoral replacement on the changing ideology of congressional seats against alternative explanations for polarization, including change in the South, income inequality and member conversion. Specifically, the variables are measured as follows:
-Change in Ideology of the Congressional Seat: This is the dependent variable and is measured by the change in the congressional seat's DW-nominate score. It is calculated as the difference between the DW-nominate score of the current member and the DW-Nominate score of the member in the previous Congress. These changing ideology scores reflect the changing patterns of partisanship in Congress.
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-Change in Constituency Preference: This controls for the fact that member ideologies may change because members strategically position themselves to be consistent with changing ideologies within their constituency. It is measured as the changing Republican presidential vote in the geographic constituency (district for House, and state for Senate); -The number of terms the member has served: We include this as a proxy measure for member conversion. In response to changes in the political environment, members may adapt by altering their voting patterns. Previous research shows that this can contribute to the polarization of parties in the 1970s. 38 We thus include a variable for the number of terms the member has served, because previous research on member conversion shows that Democrats move further left with each passing Congress and Republicans move further right.
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-Black percentage in the constituency: This controls for the possibility that a social sorting process happens, as certain demographic groups tend to vote for one party over another. 40 It is measured as the percentage of the voting-age population in the member's geographic constituency that is black, according to Census measures. 37 We also ran the analysis using ADA scores and found the results to be the same. , 1952 -1968 ', American Political Science Review, 66 (1972 Robert Axelrod, 'Presidential Election Coalitions in 1984 ', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986 , 281-4.
-Income Inequality: This is measured using the GINI coefficient, a commonly used measure of income inequality. 41 In the House, because district-by-district measures of income inequality are not available, we use state-by-state measures over time. The same measures are used in the Senate. -Dichotomous variables for region and redistricting: These test the impact of the disappearance of the one-party South 42 and, in the House, the impact of reapportionment. 43 In the House analysis, because the exact amount of reapportionment in each district cannot precisely be known, we ascertain whether each district has been reapportioned and gave it a value of 1 if it has and 0 if it has not. Although Carson et al. argue that looking at the extent of redistricting is a better measure of whether or not redistricting has an effect, 44 we contend that looking at districts that have 50 per cent or more population change biases the measure to find redistricting effects. This is a more conservative test of the redistricting hypothesis.
-Finally, we also include two dichotomous variables for each of the two possible types of electoral replacement that can occur: (1) party switches (Republican-to-Democrat or Democrat-to-Republican), or (2) same party changes (Democrat-to-Democrat or Republican-to-Republican). The variable for party-switches is the key variable in our hypothesis. Our expectation is that the seats which switch parties will show the greatest change in ideology and, hence, re-definition of partisan lines. Specifically, Democrats who are too liberal for their constituencies are replaced by Republicans (Democrat-toRepublican is positive); Republicans who are too conservative for their constituencies are replaced by Democrats (Republican-to-Democrat is negative).
In this analysis, then, the null hypothesis is that controlling for all the alternative hypotheses about the sources of polarization, the effect of electoral replacement will disappear. The alternative hypothesis is that even when accounting for these alternative hypotheses, the effect of the electoral replacement hypotheses will remain, and the coefficient on the replacement variables will not be 0. Table 2a shows the results for the House and Table 2b shows the results for the Senate. Even when we control for demographic shifts and social sorting processes (such as the changes in income and race examined thoroughly in Stonecash, Brewer and Mariani), 45 the importance of electoral replacement is clear. Looking at the Democrats in the House first, we see that across all decades, the effect of Republican-to-Democratic seat changes have the most consistently significant effect. In all decades, the magnitude of the coefficient is larger than any other coefficient, and it moves in the expected direction (negative). In other words, seats that change from Republican to Democrat become significantly more liberal, thus sorting the parties better and contributing to aggregate levels of polarization in the House. The same-party seat changes do not have a significant effect in any decade, intimating that it is the cross-party sorting that has more of an impact among Democrats. We also find that after the 1960s, redistricting does have a significant effect on ideological change. Members who get redistricted are significantly more liberal than members from districts that do not get redistricted. more conservative, and Democrats from states with a higher GINI coefficient also become more liberal. Among House Republicans, we also see that cross-party seat changes are significant. Across all decades, seats that move from being Democrat to Republican are significantly more conservative as a result. Thus, even among Republicans, the cross-party switching helps sort members appropriately by party and thus helps clarify partisan lines in the House. The within-party changes among Republicans are less clear. In the 1950s and 1960s, seats that switch hands but stay in the Republican party actually become more liberal, since partisan lines are blurred around mid-century. Beyond electoral replacement, we find that redistricting also has an effect in the 1970s and beyond. In these decades, Republicans from districts that have been redistricted are significantly more conservative than Republicans from districts that have not been redistricted. Similarly, Republicans from states with a higher GINI coefficient are more conservative. Among Republicans in the South, we see an interesting result. In the 1960s, 1970s and 1990s, Republicans in the South have a negative coefficient. This is true even though the mean DW-Nominate score for Southern Republicans in the South is consistently more conservative than Republicans from other regions throughout this time period. How can we interpret this coefficient? We look more closely at the data and find that although Republicans in the South are, on balance, replaced by more liberal members (holding all else equal), the new members are still more conservative than other members of the party. Although their raw DW-Nominate scores are more conservative than members from other regions, their ideological movement is smaller, thus leading to the negative coefficient.
In the Senate, the results are largely the same as the House. Like the House, the effect of electoral replacement is greater than the effect of other variables. Seats that go from Republican to Democrat become significantly more liberal, while seats that go from Democrat to Republican become significantly more conservative. In addition, in the 1960s, the key decade of change, Democrats replacing other Democrats are significantly more liberal. Among Republicans, the seats that switch hands within the Republican party are more liberal in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. This is probably due to the influx of northern Republicans pulling the party in a more moderate direction. The magnitude of that coefficient, however, is much smaller than the magnitude of change among seats that went Democrat to Republican. Among Democrats, the number of terms served is significant in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, but the magnitude of the effect is marginal.
As cross-pressured members leave office through electoral replacement, the number of cross-pressured members in Congress should decline. The disappearance of these members brings party and constituency preferences into better alignment, thus allowing for the repolarization of congressional parties. Figure 6 shows the number of cross-pressured members in the House and the Senate over time. In both chambers, cross-pressuring rises in the 1960s as congressional elections begin to diverge from presidential elections. These cross-pressured legislators manage to stay in office for some time through the personal vote, but by the early to mid 1970s, they begin to retire or get defeated. Through a pattern of natural electoral replacement, the number of cross-pressured legislators declines, and parties are brought back into alignment. Thus, the rise and fall in the number of cross-pressured legislators is the inverse of the pattern of polarization we observe in Figures 1 and 2 .
The importance of electoral replacement thus becomes clear only in the light of the historic decline in congressional polarization after the Second World War, and the subsequent delay in re-polarization in Congress. Since most scholars have begun with Fig. 6. Number of cross-pressured legislators in the house and senate, 1954-2000 Note: Cross-pressured members are defined as Democrats who are from conservative districts/states (constituencies that vote less than 45 per cent Democratic in a three-term moving average of presidential vote) and Republicans who are from liberal districts/states (constituencies that vote more than 55 per cent Democratic in a three-term moving average of presidential vote.
the question of why the House polarized in the 1970s and 1980s, they have been searching for sources of change in the 1970s. In truth, however, a substantial portion of change in member ideology is explained by simple patterns of electoral replacement. By understanding the divergence of congressional and presidential elections in the 1960s, however, it becomes clear that much of the re-polarization of the House and the Senate in the 1970s and 1980s was a result of a re-sorting of parties through electoral change. Other explanations, including redistricting, the changing South, income inequality and endogenous institutional change, are clearly also part of the story, but the entire historical story only becomes clear by understanding the role of cross-pressuring and delayed electoral replacement.
C O N C L U S I O N Our examination of long-term trends in the US House and Senate demonstrates that the truly unusual historical period in US congressional polarization is the period of bipartisanship immediately following the Second World War. This bipartisan era ended in the mid-1960s as the national parties began to take distinct positions on issues like race and the role of government. Although voting in presidential elections became more partisan relative to congressional elections, cross-party voting in congressional elections persisted. Thus, as the national Democratic party became more liberal and the national Republican party became more conservative, a set of legislators cross-pressured between the ideologies of their national parties and their constituencies emerged. When these cross-pressured legislators strategically retired or suffered electoral defeat, members of the opposite party who voted more consistently with constituent preferences replaced them, thus allowing for the re-definition of congressional parties. This article refines existing approaches to understanding congressional party polarization in two important ways. First, it demonstrates that any explanation of congressional party polarization should take into account both chambers of Congress. Because of the remarkable similarity in the patterns of polarization in both chambers, it is essential to seek explanations that can account for both the House and the Senate. Explanations that focus on endogenous institutional change in the House or features like redistricting that only happen in one chamber are not adequate to explain polarization across both chambers. Secondly, it puts the rising polarization of the late 1970s and 1980s into its proper historical context, demonstrating that an understanding of the immediate period after the Second World War is crucial to understanding the readjustment to polarization in later decades. Our argument focuses on the way that the unusually bipartisan era of the 1950s created a set of circumstances that enabled congressional parties to remain relatively unpolarized throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. Only by understanding the historical context can we begin to understand the polarization of the late 1970s and 1980s as a return to traditional patterns of polarization and observe the role that delayed electoral replacement played in the re-polarization of congressional parties.
